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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Close Corporations-RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF SHAREHOLDERS-FI-
DUCIARY RELATIONSHIP AMONG SHAREHOLDERS-SHAREHOLDERS'
RIGHT OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY To PARTICIPATE IN CORPORATE PUR-
CHASE OF ITS OWN STOCK FOR CORPORATE TREASURY
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc.,
- Mass. -, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975)
The term "close corporation" generally connotes a business
association in the corporate form, with a small number of share-
holders who actively participate in the management of the business,
and whose shares are not publicly traded. Close corporations usually
attempt to attain certain corporate advantages, such as limited liabil-
ity and perpetual existence, while preserving the internal attributes
of an individual proprietorship or partnership.1 The shareholders
typically double as officers and directors, equating ownership with
management and control.2 Procedural formalities in the operation
of the business are usually held to a minimum, 3 and transactions are
often completed without rigid compliance with applicable corporate
statutes. 4 Although a large percentage of American business enter-
' H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 257 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as HENN). The exigencies of a business organization with this type of dual identity have
caused statutory and judicial recognition of the distinctive nature of close corporations. See
note 6 and accompanying text infra.
2 Corporate shareholders do not ordinarily manage the business affairs of the corpora-
tion they own. The close corporation concept, however, reflects a desire to own and control a
business, and to the extent that shareholders also function as directors or officers, there is a
coincidence of ownership and management control. "[I]n close corporations, management
and ownership are substantially identical, while in public issue corporations the contrary is
true." Fleming, Desirability of Enacting Separate Statutes for Closely Held and Public Issue Corpora-
tions, 1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 17, at 115 (1957). See also Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482,
484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (equating of ownership and control as a distinctive close corporation
characteristic); Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).
3 HENN § 273.
4 See Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965) (close corporation shareholders
allowed to set up management arrangement not specifically allowed by statute); accord, Comp-
ton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 285 N.E.2d 574 (1972); Charm
Productions, Ltd. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 489 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1973). But see Somers v.
AAA Temporary Services, Inc., 5 Ill. App. 3d 931, 284 N.E.2d 462 (1972) (amendment of
by-laws by shareholders of close corporation to reduce number of directors invalid when
inconsistent with Illinois corporate law).
Close corporations are often given special treatment in dissolution proceedings. See notes
40 & 93 and accompanying text infra.
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prises are closely held,5 statutory recognition of their separate legal
status is far from commensurate with their numerical importance. 6
In recent years, however, there has been a marked trend toward
awarding distinct legal status to close corporations. 7 Reform in this
area has nevertheless been slow. Development of close corporation
law has often resulted from distinction, exception carving, and doc-
trinal innovation by the courts. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts recently utilized the last approach in Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc. 8 Lacking comprehensive statutory
I HENN § 257. Professor Henn bases this conclusion on data relating to the size of
American businesses as determined by their assets, number of employees, and tax status as
small business corporations, as indicative of "closeness." See also BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 490-91 (1975); F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02
(1971).
6 Close corporations are usually forced to comply with their state's general corporate
statutes. See W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 15 (4th ed. 1969). This
requirement can obviously lead to harsh results, and has induced judicial tolerance of slight
deviations from corporate norms in the dose corporation context. For examples of such
tolerance, see cases cited in note 4 supra.
Although the essence of a dose corporation venture is often an attempt to tailor the
corporate form to the particular needs of a small business, it has been pointed out that
[s]tate corporation laws ... are designed primarily for an enterprise characterized by
a separation of ownership and management, a large number of shareholders, and
free transferability of shares .... Thus, the owners of a close corporation will often be
unable to arrange corporate affairs in the manner they consider most satisfactory.
Note, Statutory Assistance For Closely Held Corporations, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1498 (1958).
Nevertheless, several types of statutory schemes specifically covering close corporations
are presently in force. Several states have subchapters of their general corporation statutes
applicable to any close corporation that elects to become bound by such provisions. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1974); MD. CORP. & Assoc. CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to 4-603
(1975); TEx. BuS. CORP. ACT, art. 2.30-1 (Supp. 1975). Pennsylvania subjects close corpora-
tions to certain statutory provisions unless they elect not to be covered. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 15
§§ 1371-86 (Supp. 1975-76). Other states have enacted into their corporation laws certain
provisions that are available only to corporations whose shares are not traded freely or not
traded on any organized market, which is a typical characteristic of dose corporations. See text
accompanying notes 50-53 infra. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 620 (McKinney 1963 &
Supp. 1975) (facilitating shareholder voting agreements); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (b) (1975)
(facilitating shareholder voting agreements); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.22(c) (Supp. 1975)
(relieving restrictions on power or discretion of directors).
New York has certain provisions in its corporate statute not textually addressed to close
corporations, but which are utilized primarily by close corporations, and perhaps drafted with
reference to them. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1975)
(allowing certificate of incorporation to provide for greater than normal quorum require-
ments); id. § 702 (allowing corporations with less than three shareholders to have less than the
statutory number of directors).
For a discussion of the definitional criteria used in these statutes for classifying a corpora-
tion as a close corporation, see notes 56-62 and accompanying text infra.
S"[There has been a definite, albeit inarticulate, trend toward eventual judicial treat-
ment of the dose corporation assuigeneris." Galler v. Caller, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 28, 203 N.E.2d 577,
584 (1965). See also Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 806, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1965) (Fuld, J.,
dissenting). See generally Note, supra note 6.
s -Mass.-, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
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treatment of the dose corporation, the court faced a ripe and invit-
ing opportunity for innovation and change.
I
FACTUAL SETTING OF Donahue
Donahue involved a purchase by Rodd Electrotype Co. of New
England, Inc., ("Rodd Electrotype") of its own shares from Harry
Rodd, a former director, officer, and controlling shareholder of the
corporation. 9 Wishing to retire from the business due to age, Rodd
suggested a repurchase agreement 10 to his son, who was president
and general manager of the corporation. A subsequent resolution of
the board of directors authorized Rodd Electrotype to purchase
forty-five shares from Rodd." The agreed price was $800 per
share;' 2 the corporation was to hold the stock as treasury stock.
Approximately one year after the negotiation of the repurchase
agreement, a special shareholders' meeting was held at which the
transaction was officially disclosed. Mrs. Donahue, a minority share-
holder, voted against a resolution ultimately adopted by the other
shareholders ratifying the stock repurchase from Rodd. In protest,
Mrs. Donahue offered her shares for sale to the corporation on the
9 At the time of this transaction it was well-settled in Massachusetts that a corporation
could purchase its own stock unless forbidden by statute, and such agreements were enforce-
able subject to the limitation that the purchase be in good faith and without prejudice to
creditors and shareholders. See Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 85 N.E.2d 454
(1949); Scriggins v. Thomas Dalby Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N.E. 749 (1935); Dupee v. Boston
Water Power Co., 114 Mass. 37 (1873); accord, In re Estate of Brown, 130 111. App. 2d 514, 264
N.E.2d 287 (1970). See generally Note, Stock Repurchase Abuses and the No Prejudice Rule, 59
YALE L.J. 1177 (1950). The Donahue court, however, employed a new test, different from
and stricter than the "good faith and fairness to shareholders and creditors" standard, to
evaluate the transaction involved, See notes 63-95 and accompanying text infra.
The policy of protecting shareholders and creditors from wrongful distribution of corpo-
rate assets also underlies the requirement in most states that corporate stock repurchases of its
own shares be made only out of surplus. See, e.g., Tiedje v. Aluminum Taper Milling Co., 46
Cal. 2d 450, 296 P.2d 554 (1956). See also CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1705-08 (West. 1955 & Supp.
1976); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 513(a) (McKinney 1963).
l0 The term "repurchase" is used to refer to a purchase by a corporation of its own shares
from its shareholders.
" This quantity represented slightly more than one-half of Rodd's interest in Rodd
Electrotype at the time. During the following year, Rodd distributed his remaining shares to
his children, two of whom were directors of Rodd Electrotype, in a series of gift transactions.
At the time of the repurchase agreement in question, Rodd was not technically a majority
shareholder, but the court treated him as a member of a controlling group of shareholders for
the purpose of its decision. See text accompanying note 117 infra.
2 This price was less than either liquidating value or book value per share. Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., -App. Dec.-, -, 307 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Mass. App.
1975).
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same terms as those given to Rodd, but the corporation refused to
consummate a deal, and the suit in the principal case ensued.
The plaintiff, Mrs. Donahue, alleged that the stock repurchase
by Rodd Electrotype was a violation of fiduciary duties owed to her
by the defendants in their respective capacities as controlling share-
holders, officers, and directors.1 3 She thus sought to have the pur-
chase rescinded on the basis of its infringement on her personal
rights as a minority shareholder.14 More specifically, she urged that
the controlling shareholders had a duty to cause the corporation to
offer her, as a minority shareholder, an equal opportunity to sell her
shares to the corporation. The Rodd family, as defendants, denied
that a right to equal opportunity existed in corporate stock pur-
chases for the corporate treasury. The trial court agreed with the
Rodds and found that the transaction had been carried out in good
faith and with inherent fairness.' 5 The plaintiffs suit was dismissed,
13 The named defendants were Harry Rodd, the three directors of Rodd Electrotype
(two of Harry Rodd's children and a third party), and Rodd Electrotype. Although the
plaintiff claimed to be representing the other Rodd Electrotype shareholders with the corpo-
ration as a nominal defendant, the court did not treat the suit as a derivative action, but rather
as a direct vindication of personal rights. -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 508 n.4: See note 14 infra.
"* Mrs. Donahue had originally alleged other breaches of fiduciary duties by the control-
ling shareholders and directors, including misappropriation of corporate funds for the benefit
of the Rodd family. She requested injunctive relief and restitution of misappropriated funds
in her complaint. At trial, however, her counsel stipulated that the only transaction challenged
was Rodd Electrotype's purchase of Harry Rodd's stock. -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 508 n.2.
Preferring substance over form, the court reasoned that a proper suit had been brought to
vindicate a personal right of the plaintiff, based on the alleged breaches of fiduciary duties
owed to her, a minority stockholder, by the controlling stockholders. Id.
A shareholder has the right to seek redress from another shareholder to vindicate a
personal, as distinguished from a corporate, right. Mairs v. Madden, 307 Mass. 378, 30 N.E.2d
242 (1940). Usually, corporate rights can be enforced by shareholders only through a deriva-
tive action, whereas personal rights of the stockholders may be enforced by a direct personal
action. Courts will look to the allegations of a complaint to determine whether a suit is direct or
derivative in nature, but if the allegations are merely a subterfuge to disguise corporate harm
as shareholder injury, a direct action will not be allowed. See Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor
Advertising Co., 405 Pa. 142, 173 A.2d 319 (1961). In Rose v. Schantz, 56 Wis. 2d 222, 201
N.W.2d 593 (1972), the court employed a primary-injury test, and noted that although any
injury to a corporation may incidentally harm the shareholder by depressing the value of his
shares, such injury is not sufficient to maintain a personal suit by the shareholder. "Where the
injury to the corporation is the primary injury, and any injury to stockholders secondary, it is
the derivative action alone that can be brought and maintained." Id. at 229, 201 N.W.2d at
598. Where some individual right of a stockholder is being impaired by the improper acts of a
director, however, the stockholder may bring a direct suit on his own behalf because it is his
individual right that is being violated, Id. at 228-29, 201 N.W.2d at 597. Breach of a fiduciary
duty imposed on a director or shareholder vis-h-vis another shareholder would be a personal
wrong sufficient to maintain a direct action against the wrongdoer. See Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 307 n.15 (1939); Cole Real Estate Corp. v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., -Ind.-, 310
N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (1974); Gieselmann v. Stegeman, 443 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Mo. 1969);
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 196, 123 N.E. 148, 152 (1919).
13 -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 508.
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and the appeals court of Massachusetts for Middlesex County
affirmed. 16
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the
lower courts, formulated a new definition of close corporations, and
determined that Rodd Electrotype met the criteria.17 By drawing
analogies to partnerships and other business enterprises, the court
emphasized the need for trust and loyaltyin a close corporation, and
expanded the fiduciary duties applicable to close corporation share-
holders.1 8 Noting that shareholders in close corporations face a
restricted market for their holdings 9 and that the remedy of volun-
tary dissolution was available primarily to majority interests, 20 the
court held that the dissident minority shareholder was entitled to
protection. A strict standard of "utmost good faith and loyalty" 2' was
imposed by the court on all close corporation shareholders, applica-
ble to all actions affecting the "rights and investments of other
stockholders. 2 2 Applying this new standard of fiduciary duty to
close corporation stock repurchases, the court held that:
To meet this test, if the stockholder whose shares were purchased
was a member of the controlling group, the controlling stockhold-
ers must cause the corporation to offer to each stockholder an
equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares to the
corporation at an identical price.2 3
The court determined that the Rodd family had a sufficient com-
munity of interest to make them a controlling group of sharehold-
ers, 24 and since an equal opportunity to sell had not been offered to
the plaintiff, the court granted relief.25
16 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., -App. Dec.-, 307 N.E.2d 8
(Mass. App. 1974).
17 See notes 46-55 and accompanying text infra.
18 See notes 63-91 and accompanying text infra.
11 See notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra.
20 See notes 92-94 and accompanying text infra.
21 -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
22 Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.18.
23 1d. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
24 Id. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 519.
25 The case was remanded with directions to enter either of two alternative judgments:
(1) requiring Rodd to tender the purchase price back to the corporation in return for his
shares, or (2) requiring Rodd Electrotype to purchase all of Mrs. Donahue's stock at $800 per
share, plus interest from the date of the original transaction. Id. at 521. The court's computa-
tion of the pro rata amount to be purchased from Mrs. Donahue under the second alternative
judgment is slightly confusing. Although Rodd sold only half of his shares to the corporation,
then later gave away the remaining shares to his children, Chief Justice Tauro both ig-
nored the time sequence and, in effect, pierced the corporate veil, and reasoned that by virtue
of the repurchase agreement, the corporation "acquired one hundred per cent of that portion
of his holdings (forty five shares) which he did not intend his children to own. [Therefore],
[Vol. 61:986
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This Note will discuss the impact of requiring equal opportunity
for all shareholders in close corporation stock repurchases by analyz-
ing the following four areas: (1) the Supreme Judicial Court's defini-
tion of close corporations; (2) the new standard of fiduciary duty
imposed on close corporation shareholders; (3) the equal-oportunity
doctrine derived from that duty; and (4) the implications of-Donahue
with respect to other corporate enterprises and transactions.
II
DEFINING THE CLOSE CORPORATION
A. Origin of the Enterprise
Courts and commentators have employed a variety of terms to
refer to what Chief Justice Tauro called "the close corporation"
2 6
in Donahue: "closed corporation,' 2 7 "closely held corporation, ' 28
"one-man corporation, ' 29 "family corporation,"30 "incorporated
partnership,"'3 ' and "chartered partnership. '32 These expressions
have all been used to describe the same type of organization-a
business corporation owned by a small number of people unwilling
to trade their shares freely with the public, and wishing to carefully
control the business they own.
A close corporation usually originates as a small business that
recognizes the risks infierent in a partnership or a sole pro-
prietorship--the personal liability of the owner.3 3 By incorporating,
the owners of such a business can utilize the advantages of the
corporate form such as limited liability and perpetual existence.
34
[t]he plaintiff is entitled to have one hundred per cent of her forty five shares similarly
purchased." Id.
26 Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at'511.
27 F. O'NEAL, supra note 5, § 1.04.
28 Id. O'Neal draws a distinction between the close corporation and the closely-held cor-
poration. "Close" implies shareholder intent or agreement to keep outsiders from acquiring
any interest in the corporation, while "closely-held" implies a small number of shareholders.
29 HENN § 258.
30 Id.
31 Id.
2 Id. The chartered partnership was at one time a statutorily distinct entity. See Ripin v.
United States Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447, 98 N.E. 855, 856 (1912). In Hill v.
Bellevue Gardens, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1960), aff'd, 297 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
the court pierced the corporate veil because of oppression and bad faith on the part of
majority shareholders, and referred to the "pierced" corporation as a "chartered partner-
ship." 190 F. Supp. at 769.
" W. CARY, supra note 6, at 20.
34 As soon as states began to allow incorporation for any lawful business purpose, many
1976]
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The formalities of corporate organization and management, how-
ever, are often ill-suited to the needs of businesses that originated
with a limited scope of ownership and control.35 Though adopting
the corporate form, most close corporations desire to preserve the
internal structure of a sole proprietorship or partnership.36 The
American legal system is aware of this desire, and has often taken
steps to facilitate it. To preserve the principle of delectus personae,
3 7
reasonable restraints imposed on the transfer of shares in close
corporations are usually upheld. 38 Close corporation shareholder
agreements allocating management functions traditionally vested in
the board of directors are granted both statutory and judicial toler-
ance.3 9 Even the extreme remedy of dissolution is more readily
applied to a close corporation than to a public-issue corporation,
40 if
circumstances such as deadlock or oppression exist.
private enterprises formerly conducted as partnerships or sole proprietorships "became the
subject of corporate control and ownership." Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205
N.Y. 442, 447, 98 N.E. 855, 857 (1912).
15 "In America today there is developing some recognition that a closely held concern
may in fact function upon an entirely different basis than a public corporation. Its success may
depend upon the cooperative efforts and mutual confidence of its shareholder owners." W.
CARY, supra note 6, at 362-63.
36 See also HENN § 257.
3 "A choice or selection of the person." BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 327 (3d ed.
1969). Owners of many business enterprises wish to choose their compatriots carefully.
38 HENN § 281. A restriction agreement in the by-laws or among shareholders usually
takes the form of an option, giving the corporation or certain shareholders a first right of
refusal on any shares offered for sale. The option to buy can often be drafted to vest on the
death or other incapacitation of a shareholder. -Mass. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 512 n.13. In
Massachusetts, such restrictions are valid and binding on the corporation and its shareholders.
Samia v. Central Oil Co., 339 Mass. 101, 158 N.E.2d 469 (1959); Albert E. Touchet, Inc. v.
Touchet, 264 Mass. 499, 163 N.E. 184 (1928). These restrictions are important in keeping a
close corporation "close," and in addition may also be crucial in maintaining SEC exemptions
and Subchapter S status. See notes 42, 50 and accompanying text infra.
39 See Hornstein, Shareholder Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040
(1950); note 6 and accompanying text supra.
For a well-reasoned point of view on shareholder agreements in close corporations, see
Galler v. Galler, 32 Il1. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965), where the court said:
Several shareholder-director agreements that have technically "violated" the letter of
the Business Corporation Act have nevertheless been upheld in the light of the
existing circumstances.
W here... no injury to a minority interest appears, no fraud or apparent
injury to the public or creditors is present, and no clearly prohibitory statutory
language is violated, we can see no valid reason for precluding the parties from
reaching any arrangements concerning the management of the corporation which
are agreeable to all.
Id. at 28, 30, 203 N.E.2d at 585.
" See generally Note, Dissolution of The Close Corporation, 41 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 239 (1966).
In In re Pivot Punch & Die Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 713, 182 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1959), the court
treated the close corporation as a partnership clothed with benefits peculiar to-a corporation,
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By employing a combination of these devices, a close corpora-
tion can achieve informality of organization and operation, flexibil-
ity of financing and distribution of profits, participation by share-
holders in management, and ease of dissolution. 4' Prohibitive taxa-
don can also be avoided by the close corporation in certain in-
stances. 42 However, dose corporations have an inherent tax disad-
and decided that when the requisite trust, loyalty, and confidence of this quasi-partnership
ceased to exist, the corporation i as no longer beneficial to its deadlocked shareholders and
would be dissolved. Id. at 716, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 463. This case has been praised as standing for
the proposition that a lack of faith and trust, which produces a deadlocked close corporation,
may be the basis for finding that dissolution is beneficial to the shareholders of even a
profitable corporation.In re Surchin, 55 Misc. 2d 888, 286 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1967). A public-issue
corporation, on the other hand, would have to comply strictly with the applicable corporate
statutes to obtain dissolution. See also notes 93-94 and accompanying text infra.
4 1 A close corporation will not always, however, provide the desired protection of the
business enterprise. Just as some courts overlook minor deviations from corporate norms in the
close corporation context, other courts go more readily to the heart of the enterprise and treat
the shareholders as partners, especially where outsiders are involved. "[Glrounds for disre-
garding corporateness or regarding the corporation as an instrumentality of the shareholders,
thereby subjecting the shareholders to personal liability, arise more frequently in close corpo-
rations than in others." IEN § 261. See In re Ostwald's Estate, 20 Misc. 2d 1001, 1006, 189
N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (1959), holding:
Since the question is not between the corporation and an outsider, this Court in an
application of its equitable jurisdiction disregards the corporate form, deals with the
relationship as one not wholly impersonal and treats the parties as co-partners.
See also Hill v. Bellevue Gardens, Inc. 190 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1960), where the court stated
that it would pierce the corporate veil and regard close corporations as associations of persons
to the extent necessary to grant appropriate relief following a wrongful use of the corporate
form.
The New York courts have also developed a line of cases that limit the dual-identity
recognition for joint ventures under the corporate form. In Weisman v. Awnair Corp.
3 N.Y.2d 444, 165 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1957), the court said:
[T]he rule is well settled that a joint venture may not be carried on by individuals
through the corporate form .... The two forms of business are mutually exclusive,
each governed by a separate body of law. When parties "adopt the corporate form,
with the corporate shield extended over them to protect them against personal
liability, they cease to be partners and have only the rights, duties, and obligations of
shareholders. They cannot be partners inter sese and a corporation as to the rest of the
world".
Id. at 449, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 749-50, quoting Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 598-99, 75 A.
558, 571 (1910). The court refused to extend fiduciary relationships between the co-owners of
this incorporated joint venture:
[W]hen individuals do determine to conduct business through a corporation, as is
here alleged, they are not at one and the same time joint venturers and stockholders,
fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries, personally liable and not personally liable.
Id. at 449, 165 N.Y.2d at 749-50. Macklem v. Marine Park Homes, Inc., 17 Misc.2d 439, 191
N.Y.S.2d 374 (1955), affd mem., 8 A.D.2d 824, 191 N.Y.S.2d 545 (2d Dep't 1959), aff'd without
opinion, 8 N.Y.2d 1076, 207 N.Y.S.2d 451, 170 N.E.2d 455 (1960) appears to retreat from this
strict non-recognition of the dual nature of incorporated joint ventures. For a critical discus-
sion of the New York case law on joint ventures under the corporate form, see Conway, New
York Fiduciary Concept in Incorporated Partnerships and Joint Ventures, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 297
(1961).
412 Corporate income is normally subject to double taxation-once as income to the
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vantage because they may face more frequent application of the
accumulated earnings tax 43 than their publicly-owned counter-
parts. 44 The end result of these features is a corporation recognized
by courts and statutes as exemplifying:corporate externalities while
utilizing noncorporate internalities. It has been recommended that
close corporation statutory reform reflect this recognition. 45
B. The Donahue Definition
Because Massachusetts had no corporate statutes specifically
directed at close corporations, any judge-made law regulating close
corporations required a definitional starting point to determine thresh-
old coverage of an equal-opportunity holding 46 and to place a
limitation on its applicability. The court in Donahue "deem[ed] a close
corporation to be typified by: (1) a small number of stockholders; (2)
no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority
stockholder participation in the management, direction and opera-
tions of the corporation. '47 These three criteria are used with vary-
ing degrees of emphasis in other definitions of close corporations.
Although a close corporation is usually a small business, size
corporation, and again as income to shareholders in the form of dividend distributions. INr.
REv. CODE of 1954, § 61(a). Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows
qualifying small business corporations to elect to have their earnings taxed as personal income
to the shareholders, and not at the corporate level, thus avoiding double taxation of corporate
profits. A small business corporation as defined by INr. REV. CODE of 1954 § 1371 (a), can make
the election referred to if the corporation has a single class of shares that are held by not more
than ten shareholders, and meets certain other requirements, including unanimous share-
holder election of Subchapter S. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 §§ 1371-72 (1975). The court in
Donahue suggested that Subchapter S is a recognition by the federal government that close
corporations are merely incorporated partnerships, and will be taxed accordingly. -Mass.-,
328 N.E.2d 512 n.12.
" INT. REv. CODE of 1954 §§ 531-37.
14 See Golconda Mining Corp. v. Commissioner, 507 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974), where the
court noted that although §§ 531-37 do not distinguish between publicly and closely held
corporations,
Congress did not intend to change the longstanding practice and application of the
tax to closely held corporations and these corporations alone. [Golconda is] a widely
held, publicly owned corporation whose stock is similarly and actively traded. It is,
therefore, not subject to the accumulated earnings tax provisions.
Id. at 597. The Internal Revenue Service has stated that it will not follow Golconda and that
it recognizes no impediment to the imposition of the accumulated earnings tax on publicly
held corporations. Rev. Rul. 75-305, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 30, at 12. For an extended
discussion of the taxation aspects of close corporations, see T. NEss & E. VOGEL, TAXATION OF
THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION (1967).
'5 "[Ilt is believed that participants in a close corporation desire to and do act as partners,
insofar as possible, and it is in this area that their needs must be accommodated in the statutes.
S.. Fleming, supra note 2, at 115.
" See notes 96-134 and accompanying text infra.
4 -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
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alone is not a determinative factor.48 But because of the peculiar
characteristics of close corporations that arise from the coincidence
of ownership and management, a close corporation is usually de-
fined as a corporation with relatively few shareholders.4 9 The lim-
ited number of shareholders is directly related to the infrequent
trading of close corporation shares.
A close corporation differs from other corporations because
there is usually no public issue or public trading of its voting shares, 50
due to a desire to preserve the identity of ownership and control.
This is accomplished by restricting share ownership to a certain
group or family. 51 A lack of free share trading, however, results in a
limited market for the close corporation's stock. "Since shares in a
close corporation are rarely traded, much less listed on a security
exchange, their value is usually difficult to determine, and there is,
as a practical matter, very little market for such shares."52 Lack of a
ready market for shares outside the corporation is a problem for
48 It has been noted that "[t]he amount of a corporation's assets, the scope of its opera-
tions, the number of persons it employs, or the volume of its sales does not determine whether
[a corporation] is 'close.'" F. O'NAL, supra note 5, § 1.03. In fact, the Ford Motor Company
was a close corporation until it publicly offered its stock in 1955. Id.
4' "In other words, a 'close corporation' means, in the vernacular a corporation in which
the stock is held in few hands, or in few families, and wherein it is not at all, or only rarely,
dealt in by buying or selling." Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1935); accord,
Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. App. 2d 16, 21, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1965).
See notes 57-61 and accompanying text infra for numerical limitations placed on the
number of shareholders by statutory definitions of close corporations.
50 See quotation from Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1935), in note 49supra. As
a result of this limited trading, minority stock in a close corporation has a poor market value, if
it has one at all. W. CARY, supra note 6, at 469.
This limited distribution and trading usually enables close corporations to avoid the
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970). Close
corporations are normally able to take advantage of the purely intrastate offering and private
offering exemptions found in §§ 3(a) (ii) and 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77c(ii), 77d(2) (1970):
By virtue of express exemptions, there is no requirement for the registering (and
hence there will be no registering) of!a security that is sold by "any person other than
an issuer, underwriter, or dealer" or that is sold even by an issuer if the transaction is
one "not involving any public offering." The quoted words will exempt from registra-
tion just about any deal involving shares of a close corporation, even a new "issue"
sold by that corporation in raising additional capital.., so long as in the process...
the corporation does not advertise generally and does not solicit so many persons as
to make a "public" offering.
Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares In a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C.
Statutes, 18 LAw & CoNrTEMP. PROB. 505,506 (1953) (footnotes omitted). See also Birnbaum, The
Issue and Transfer of Capital Stock: A Memorandum and Checklist for Massachusetts Lan yers, 59
MASS. L.Q. 351 (1975).
"d This limitation is usually embodied in shareholder-imposed restrictions found in the
by-laws or other shareholder agreements. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
52 HENN § 281.
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dissident close corporation shareholders, and much of Donahue
turns on this restricted ability to trade.53
The close corporation is also often characterized by an integra-
tion of ownership and management.54 This characteristic reflects the
quasi-partnership features of the close corporation. Some statutory
provisions expressly allow close corp~rtion shareholders to exercise
management rights.55 The court in Donahue refers to majority
shareholder participation in management, as opposed to total
shareholder participation, probably recognizing that even in close
corporations there may be nominal or dormant shareholders.
C. Statutory Comparison
Those corporate statutes that provide special subchapters appli-
cable to close corporations 56 use essentially the same threshold tests
to define close corporations as the Donahue court employed. Dela-
ware and Pennsylvania, for example, require close corporations to
file a certificate of incorporation, in accordance with their corporate
statute. These statutes provide that all classes of stock be held of
record by not more than thirty people, that they be subject to one or
more permissible restrictions on transfer, and that the shares not be
publicly offered within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933. 5 7
Texas has essentially the same requirements, but limits the number
of permissible shareholders to fifteen. 58 Florida once defined a close
corporation simply as a corporation for profit whose shares are not
generally traded in organized securities markets, but this separate
treatment has been abandoned. 59 Other states have enacted certain
statutory provisions applicable to corporations whose shares are not
traded on any organized securities exchange, 60 without expressly
5 See text accompanying notes 86-87 infra.
5 See note 2 and accompanying text supra. See generally Note, supra note 6.
5 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 620 (McKinney Supp. 1975); MD. CoRn. & Assoc.
CODE ANN. § 4-403 (1975). See also note 6 supra.
5 See note 6 supra.
5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1371 (Supp. 1975). A close
corporation that complies with these requirements is subject to the special close corporation
subchapter provisions. An existing corporation can elect to become a close corporation by
amending its certificate of incorporation to comply with § 342 or § 1371 of these acts,
respectively. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 344 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1374 (Supp. 1975).
58 TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT art. 2-30.1 (Supp. 1975).
5 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.70(2) (Supp. 1975), repealed by FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.001-
.411 (Supp. 1975) (Special Pamphlet). A qualified corporation could elect to bring itself within
the provision of the close corporation subchapter; otherwise its provisions were permissive,
not mandatory. Id. § 608.70(1) (Supp. 1975). Florida's General Corporation Act has been
amended, and since January 1, 1976, there has been no statutory distinction between close
corporations and general corporations. See id. §§ 607.001-.411 (Supp. 1975) (Special Pam-
phlet).
60 See note 6 supra.
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differentiating between close and public-issue corporations. In stat-
utory definitions the emphasis seems to be on the lack of free or
organized trading of shares. This reflects a recognition that the most
distinctive feature of close corporations, and the feature that merits
special statutory treatment, is their closely-held aspect; i.e., in order
to provide identity of ownership and management and close per-
sonal working relationships, the share ownership in close corpora-
tions must be restricted to a limited group of individuals.
Justice Stewart once declined to define obscenity, stating only
that he knew it when he saw it.61 Perhaps the Donahue court has done
the same. Donahue provides a framework for analyzing corporate
practices to determine whether a corporation is close, but later cases
will demonstrate whether the Massachusetts courts will merely
"know one when they see one." The strictness of definitional criteria
for close corporations is primarily a function of the degree of sophis-
tication of the corporate statutes in a jurisdiction.62 Obviously, spe-
cial statutory close corporation provisions need a screening
threshold definition to determine scope of coverage. Since Mas-
sachusetts has no developed statutory scheme for close corporations,
the court's definition in Donahue has merit. It combines the features
traditionally associated with close corporations in a manner that has
enough flexibility to allow for intercorporate differences and judi-
cial interpretation before binding a corporation to close corporation
case law.
III
SHAREHOLDERS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
The court in Donahue imposed a new standard of fiduciary duty
on close corporation stockholders:
Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation
to the partnership, the trust and confidence which are essential to
this scale and manner of enterprise, and the inherent danger to
minority interests in the close corporation, we hold that stock-
holders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the
same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe to one another.... [W]e have defined the standard
of duty owed by partners to one another as the "utmost good faith
and loyalty" . . . .Stockholders in close corporations must dis-
61 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (concurring opinion, Stewart, J.)
62 The trend toward statutory definition and differentiation for close corporations seems
to be increasing. See generally Note, supra note 6. But note also Florida's reversion to general
coverage for dose corporations. See note 59 supra.
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charge their management and stockholder responsibilities in con-
formity with this strict good faith standard.
63
This standard is imposed on all shareholders in close corporations,
without regard to status as a majority or minority shareholder, and
without regard to official capacity as an officer or director. A sig-
nificant departure from traditional notions of corporate fiduciary
duties has therefore been adopted in Massachusetts.
As a vehicle for protection of shareholder interests, imposing
fiduciary duties between individuals in various corporate capacities is
not a novel idea. Corporate law abounds with well-settled fiduciary
relationships, often differing only in the verbal formulations of
tests and standards. For example, directors of a corporation stand in
a fiduciary relationship with the corporation, requiring the directors
to exercise their powers with due care, best judgment, and utmost
good faith. 64 Based on these duties, challenged transactions between
directors and their corporation are closely scrutinized with the bur-
den on the director to show the good faith and inherent fairness of
the transaction. 65 Directors also owe a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation.66 As early as 1919, the New York Court of
6 -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
64 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F.2d 270, 273
(8th Cir. 1935). A myriad of cases support this notion. Other standards used to measure a
director's obligation to the corporation are: "strong fiduciary relationship" (Nordin v. Kalden-
baugh, 7 Ariz. App. 9, 13, 435 P.2d 740, 744 (1968)); "utmost good faith" (Winchell v. Plywood
Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 177, 84 N.E.2d 454, 460 (1949)); "utmost good faith and loyalty" (Lash
v. Lash Furniture Co. of Barre, Inc., 130 Vt. 517, 421, 296 A.2d 207, 211 (1962)); Johnson v.
Central Standard Life Ins. Co., 102 Il1. App. 2d 15, 29, 243 N.E.2d 376, 383 (1968)); and
"absolute fidelity" (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 410-11, 8 N.E.2d 895,
907 (1937)).
65 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171,
84 N.E.2d 454 (1949); Lash v. Lash Furniture Co., 130 Vt. 517, 296 A.2d 207 (1972). But see
Cottrell v. Paucatuck Co., 36 Del. Ch. 169, 128 A.2d 225 (1956) (acts of directors in selling corporate
assets clothed with presumption of good faith and honest business judgment). Although courts
hesitate to interfere with the normal businessjudgment of corporate directors when discharging
their management duties, they will intervene where a breach of fiduciary duty is shown. See, e.g.,
Spiegelv. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937), where the court noted: "It
is no part of thejudicial function to substitute its business view for that of those vested by law with
the control of corporate affairs."Id. at 433, 8 N.E.2d at 915. Contrary toDonahue, Spiegel used the
businessjudgment rule to hold that directors making purchases of stock for the corporate treasury
were not required to buy ratably from the shareholders.
The reluctance of courts to interfere with business judgments of directors makes it
difficult for close corporation shareholders to compel declaration of dividends, or otherwise
attack decisions and transactions consumated by directors in their day-to-day exercise of
management authority. See, e.g., Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397, 53 N.E.2d
230 (1944). The court in Donahue expressed concern over dividend withholding as one of the
potential techniques for oppression of minority shareholders. -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 513.
66 Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537 (D. Nev. 1972);
Herald Co. v. Bonfils, 315 F. Supp. 497 (D. Col. 1970); Johnson v. Central Standard Life Ins.
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Appeals in Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co. 67 held that directors
of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship to the sharehold-
ers.
The directors are bound by all those rules of conscientious fair-
ness, morality and honesty in purpose, which the law imposes as
the guides for those who are under the fiduciary obligations and
responsibilities. They are held, in official action, to the extreme
measure of candor, unselfishness and good faith. Those princi-
ples are rigid, essential and salutary.68
The Donahue standard, however, applies to all close corporation
shareholders, not only to those who are also directors, and must
therefore be compared with prevailing views on shareholder
fiduciary duties.
Majority shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority share-
holders.69 If the majority shareholder is not a director or an officer,
the imposition of a fiduciary obligation is often conditioned on the
exercise of sufficient control in the management of the corpora-
tion.70 In close corpgrations, however, there is an assumption that
Corp., 102 Ill. App. 2d 15, 243 N.E.2d 376 (1968); Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517
(Iowa 1974); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919);
Grognet v. Fox Valley Trucking Service, 172 N.W.2d 812 (Wis. 1969); cf. Ragsdale v. Ken-
nedy, 22 N.C. App. 509, 207 S.E.2d 301 (1974).
At one time officers and directors were considered fiduciaries toward the corporation
only, but the concept of fiduciary duty was later expanded to the shareholders. See Weatherby
v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 94 Idaho 504, 492 P.2d 43 (1972). See also notes 88-90 and
accompanying text infra. Since shareholders are the personification of a corporation, an entity
that is otherwise intangible, it follows that if directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation
they must also owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.
67 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919).
68 Id. at 193, 124 N.E. at 151. The fiduciary obligation of directors to shareholders bars
them from using the stock-issue d'vice to change voting control patterns (see Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967)), from selling stock to other
directors to place corporate control within a certain group (see Gieselmann v. Stegeman, 443
S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1969)) or from otherwise discriminating against a shareholder or group of
shareholders in corporate transactions. The fiduciary standard employed by the Donahue
court-utmost good faith and loyalty-has been used by other courts to bind directors in their
official action. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Nordin v. Kaldenbaugh, 7 Ariz. App.
9, 435 P.2d 740 (1968); Johnson v. Central Standard Life Ins. Co., 102 Ill. App. 2d 15, 243
N.E.2d 376 (1968).
69 Bayliss v. Rood, 424 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d 65 (10th
Cir. 1967). As with a director's fiduciary duty to the corporation, the cases supporting the
proposition that majority shareholders owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders are
voluminous. Even under Zambian law this duty is recognized. Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D.P.A. 1971). But see Jacobs v. Regas, 75 Ill. App. 2d 283,
221 N.E.2d 140 (1966), rev'd, 37 Ill. 2d 578, 229 N.E.2d 487 (1967); Mairs v. Madden, 307
Mass. 378, 30 N.E.2d 242 (1940) (shareholders not fiduciaries by virtue of majority interest
per se). The Donahue court stated thatMairs will no longer be followed in this respect. -Mass.
at-, 328 N.E.2d at 517.
70 See South Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919), where the court explained that
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shareholders exercise management control by definition.71 Thus,
there is even less need for correlating fiduciary duty with a share-
holder's official status within the corporation. In Hartung v. Architects
Hartung/Odle/Burke, Inc., 72 the Indiana Court of Appeals held that
directors, officers, and shareholders of close corporations were
fiduciaries, and that the same standard of fairness, honesty, and
openness applied regardless of the capacity in which it arose.7'3 As
with directors, several standards have been imposed by courts on
shareholders in their dealings that affect other shareholders. At
minimum, the equivalent of an arms-length bargain is required,'7 4
and most courts require that elements of fairness, honesty, and
openness be present in dealings among shareholders.7 5
[t]he majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary
relation toward the minority, as much so as the corporation itself or its officers and
directors.
Id. at 487-88; accord, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969),
modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Mims v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 14 Ariz. App. 190, 481 P.2d
876 (1971).
At least with respect to larger public-issue corporations, New York courts have stressed
the existence of control, held and exercised, as being crucial in the imposition of fiduciary
obligations between shareholders. See Seventeen Stone Corp. v. General Tel. Co., 204
F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Rank Organization Ltd. v. Pathe Labs., Inc., 33 Misc. 2d 748,
227 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. 1962). In Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court noted:
[t]he New York courts have frequently held that a dominant or majority stockholder
does not become a fiduciary for other stockholders merely by reason of his voting
power. It is only when he steps out of his role as stockholder and begins to usurp the
functions of director in the management of corporate affairs that such a duty is
imposed.
Id. at 383-84; accord, Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101 (D. Del.
1974).
7 See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
72 -Ind.-, 301 N.E.2d 240 (1973).
73 In view of the informal way in which the affairs of most close corporations are
conducted, there is usually no necessity for distinguishing between the fiduciary
duties, of the controlling participants in their various capacities as shareholders,
directors, and officers.... [W]henever a number of stockholders "constitute them-
selves or are by the law constituted, the managers of corporate affairs or interests,
they stand in much the same attitude towards the other or minority stockholders that
the directors sustain generally toward all the stockholders, and the law requires of
them the utmost good faith" and a court of equity "will protect a minority stockholder
against the acts or threatened acts of the board of directors or of the managing
stockholders of the corporation, which violate the fiduciary relation and are directly
injurious to the stockholders."
O'Neal, Oppugnancy and Oppression in Close Corporations: Remedies in America and In Britain, 1
B.C. IND. & COMm. L. REv. 1, 8 (1959), quoting Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226
N.Y. 185, 195-96, 123 N.E. 148, 151-52 (1919).
, See, e.g., In re Brunner Air Compressor Corp., 287 F. Supp. 256 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
7' See, e.g., Sankin v. 5410 Connecticut Ave. Corp., 281 F. Supp. 524 (D.D.C. 1968), aff'd,
410 F.2d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. dehied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970). Courts often incorporate by
reference the standard of duty applied tojoint venturers and partners, as elucidated by Chief
Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928):
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Shareholders also have rights derived from the fiduciary duties
owed to them by other shareholders, even as to transactions in which
they are not directly involved. Minority shareholders often object to
the results of a sale by a majority shareholder of his controlling
interest. If the transaction represents a breach of fiduciary duty
owed to other shareholders, the sellers will be held liable to them. In
Perlman v. Feldmann, 6 for example, the Second Circuit held that a
seller of a controlling interest in a corporation could be liable to the
other shareholders, based on either a director's or a controlling
shareholder's fiduciary duty for that part of the sale price that
unfairly reflected a premium for control.77
[A] duty of the finest loyalty [is required]. Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden by those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate.
When a court cites Judge Cardozo in Meinhard, or Justice Douglas in Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939), it often spells doom for the challenged transaction. See also Helms v.
Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957), where the court held:
In an intimate business venture such as this, stockholders of a close corporation
occupy a position similar to that ofjoint adventurers and partners. While courts have
sometimes declared that stockholders "do not bear toward each other that same
relation of trust and confidence which prevails in partnerships," this view ignores the
practical realities of . . . a small business enterprise in which the stockholders,
directors, and managers are the same persons.
Id. at 486 (citations omitted). These standards, however, mean little when standing alone; their
force is better understood by examining the result dictated by fiduciary duty requirements in a
given situation. For example, shareholder fiduciary duty bars the majority from excluding the
minority from fair participation in the fruits of a sale of corporate property made through
exercise of majority control. South Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919). When share-
holders induce other shareholders to sell their shares in the corporation, fiduciary duties
require full and honest disclosure by the buying shareholders concerning all matters relating
to the enterprise. Mendelsohn v. Leather Mfg. Corp., 326 Mass. 226, 93 N.E.2d 537 (1950).
See also Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wash. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970), where the court required
full disclosure of all material and relevant inside information that the selling shareholders
were unable to obtain. Similar disclosure would be required by directors when inducing
shareholders to sell their interest in the corporation. Each of these cases is merely an applica-
tion of fiduciary duty standards to a given fact situation, but the result is that certain practices
become mandatory in similar transactions.
76 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
7 Perlman stands for the proposition that a majority shareholder may usually dispose of
his shares to outsiders without having to account to the corporation for profit, but under
circumstances amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty, the minority shareholders may have a
cause of action against the seller for the premium he received to the extent that it represents a
corporate asset. For an extensive discussion of this case, see Hill, Sale of Controlling Shares, 70
HARV. L. REV. 986 (1957). In Donahue, the price at which Rodd sold his shares was less than
either book value or liquidating value per share, so accountability for a premium was not an
issue. -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 509-11, 521.
Liability to minority shareholders may also be imposed when the sale results in looting or
fraud perpetrated on the corporation by the purchaser of the controlling interest. Insuran-
shares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940) established the principle
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Donahue was similar to the sale-of-control cases in that it in-
volved a shareholder objecting to a transaction in which she was not
directly involved. Mrs. Donahue had a more immediate interest,
however, since the corporation itself was a party to the transaction.
She asserted that the purchase of Rodd's shares by the corporation
was a breach of the fiduciary duty owed to her by the participants in
the transactions. To grant relief, the court had several alternatives.
First, because Rodd and his sons were directors, the court could
have looked at the directors' fiduciary obligations. Second, although,
Rodd was not a majority shareholder, he was a member of the
controlling group of shareholders.7 8 The court could have aggre-
gated these controlling shareholders and assessed their fiduciary
duties. 9 Instead, the court chose a broader approach: Donahue
imposed a requirement of utmost good faith and loyalty on all close
corporation shareholders, whether they were merely shareholders,
majority shareholders, directors, or officers. All transactions affect-
ing the rights and investments of other shareholders must meet this
test.8 0 The extension of fiduciary duties by Donahue to all close
that sellers of a controlling interest in a corporation were under a duty to the corporation to
refrain from selling their control to outsiders when a reasonable person would anticipate
damage to the corporation at the hands of the outsiders. This recovery would run in favor of
the corporation. In McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969), the court admitted
that even a majority shareholder is generally free to dispose of his shares at any time and for
any price to which he may agree. Nonetheless, the court pointed out that a majority share-
holder exercising control, and hence a fiduciary, would be liable to the other shareholders for
disposing of his shares when the surrounding circumstances were such that the seller should
have known that his purchaser was unscrupulous; accord, Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d
573 (4th Cir. 1973). It is not necessary to show that the seller had actual knowledge that the
buyer would defraud the corporation in order to grant relief. It is sufficient that a reasonably
prudent man would have been put on guard by the surrounding circumstances. Harman v.
Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Kan. 1974). Both Swinney and McDaniel, however, involved
cases where the facts did notjustify a finding of negligence in the sale of control, and recovery
was denied. The ability of the remaining shareholders to recover personally, as opposed to a
recovery for the corporation, is therefore not established clearly. See note 14 supra.
, See id. and text accompanying note 117 infra.
, See notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra.
s The court suggested that the phrase "transactions affecting the rights and investments
of other stockholders" limited the holding, and that the duties imposed by Donahue did not'
necessarily apply where the corporation was not a party to the transaction. -Mass. at-, 328
N.E.2d at 515 n. 18. As Justice Wilkens pointed out in his concurrence, however, the implica-
tions seem broader than the court indicates.Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 52 1. It is hard to imagine a
corporate or shareholder transaction that will not eventually affect the rights and investments
of other nonparticipating shareholders, especially in a close corporation. The cases involving a
sale of control to outsiders seem to apply the same fiduciary duties to the selling shareholders
as in transactions directly involving the corporation. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 76-77,
88-90. Thus, Donahue's standard of fiduciary duty will probably have a broader application
than the court was willing to admit. At a minimum, however, theDonahue court has preserved
enough latitude to re-examine other corporate and shareholder transactions in light of this
new standard, and the strictness of the standard "utmost good faith and loyalty" seems to
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corporation shareholders, regardless of their capacity, thus takes
cognizance of the fact that these capacities do merge in a close
corporation. To obtain the coincidence of ownership and control
that is sought in close corporations, the shareholders, officers, and
directors are very often the same persons. Therefore, it seems only
logical that fiduciary duties in close corporations should cut across
the full gamut of corporate activity and apply with equal force to all
of the individual participants.8'
The stringency of the standard imposed by the court in Donahue
is also significant. Admittedly, a standard such as utmost good faith
and loyalty is hollow and impotent when standing by itself, and its
true import will depend on judicial application in various fact situa-
tions. But the Donahue court did imply that an extremely high
measure of duty is required of close corporation shareholders. This
standard of behavior for close corporation shareholders was man-
dated, in the court's opinion, by several peculiarities and dilemmas
facing minority shareholders in close corporations.8 2
The Donahue court justified the imposition of a strict fiduciary
duty on several grounds. The similarity of close corporations to
partnerships and sole proprietorships has already been discussed,8 3
and the extent to which the court accommodated reality by basing its
rationale on this similarity was therefore not surprising.84 The court
was also concerned with the plight of a dissident close corporation
minority shareholder, who faced no ready market for his shares and
was unable to obtain dissolution, and thus was readily susceptible to
oppression and freeze-out techniques exercised by the majority.8 5
imply that the court is willing to do so. In Cain v. Cain, -App. Dec.-, 334 N.E.2d 650 (Mass.
App. 1975), the court noted that whatever limitations are placed on the extension of the
Donahue standard, it would be particularly applicable to a case where one of the shareholders
in a dose corporation formed another corporation and acquired some of the business origi-
nally enjoyed by the first corporation. Id. at 655.
81 It seems unlikely that nominal shareholders will be unduly hampered by this test, since
by definition they will lack the leverage needed to become intimately involved in corporate
transactions. Any shareholder in a close corporation with more than a nominal interest,
however, should be subject to this standard since he will invariably be an active participant in
corporate affairs.
82 The standard of utmost good faith and loyalty applies equally to all close corporation
shareholders, including the minority. The court's main concern, however, was for the plight
of the minority. See notes 85-94 and accompanying text infra.
83 See text accompanying notes 1-5, 26-47 supra.
84 In Cain v. Cain, -App. Dec.-, 334 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. App. 1975), the court-sup-
ported Donahue's recognition of the similarity of close corporation shareholders' fiduciary
duties to partners' fiduciary duties, and applied partnership law to assess the shareholders'
duties to the close corporation.
85 The danger of oppression of a minority shareholder was recognized as early as the
turn of the century. See Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 98 N.E. 855
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However, the facts surrounding the stock repurchase in Donahue do
not reveal an attempted freeze-out. The only direct effect on the
plaintiff was a restriction on the available market for her shares, with
no apparent conscious effort to force her out of the enterprise. The
court, therefore, seemed to be more concerned with the lack of
judicial and extra-judicial remedies facing a dissident minority
shareholder.
This lack of adequate minority shareholder remedies was ap-
propriately illustrated by the court's statement that the minority
stockholder in a close corporation
cannot easily reclaim his capital. In a large public corporation, the
oppressed or dissident minority shareholder could sell his stock in
order to extricate some of his invested capital. By definition, this
market is not available for shares in the close corporation....
Thus, in a close corporation, the minority stockholders may be
trapped in a disadvantageous situation. No outsider would know-
ingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minority. The
outsider would have the same difficulties. To cut losses, the minor-
ity stockholder may be compelled to deal with the majority. This is
the capstone of the majority plan. 86
Because of the lack of a ready market for close corporation shares,
artificially created markets, especially those concocted by individuals
in a position of control, were viewed by the Donahue court with great
suspicion.8 7
(1912), where the court said:
There was danger, however, in the very plenitude of the power granted to such
corporations, as has been shown by the litigations in the courts on claims of 4ppres-
sive or dishonest action of the majority towards the minority. Indeed, abuse of power
by a majority in many of these private corporations had become a scandal.
Id. at 447, 98 N.E. at 856.
The potential opportunities for the majority to oppress or freeze out a minority share-
holder are numerous and no one would quarrel with provision of a remedy for an oppressed
minority shareholder. The definitive work on freeze-outs is F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE OUTS" OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERs-EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS AssocIATEs (1975).
O'Neal discusses several oppressive techniques frequently employed by majority shareholders
in close corporations: withholding dividends, appropriation of business opportunity, mergers
and consolidations, issuance of new shares, and other techniques designed to force sharehold-
ers to leave the enterprise.
'6 -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15. See also Galler v. Galler, 32 111. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d
577 (1965), where the court said:
While the shareholder of a public-issue corporation may readily sell his shares on the
open market should management fail to use, in his opinion, sound business judg-
ment, his counterpart of the dose corporation often has a large total of his entire
capital invested in the business and has no ready market for his shares should he
desire to sell.
Id. at 27, 203 N.E.2d at 583-84. Additionally, minority stock in a closely-held corporation has a
poor market value, if one at all. See W. GARY, supra note 6, at 469.
87 -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19.
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InJones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.,88 majority shareholders created
a market for their shares outside the corporation by forming a
holding company and exchanging their shares for shares of that
holding company. No similar opportunity was given to the minority.
The majority shareholders then made a public offering of the hold-
ing company stock, creating a public market for their shares, and
making stock in the original company unmarketable except to the
-holding company. The California Supreme Court held that using
majority control to obtain a market for shares not available to all
shareholders violated the fiduciary duties owed to minority share-
holders by directors, officers, and controlling shareholders. 89 The
court further held that when no market existed for shares, such as in
a close corporation, controlling shareholders could not use their
power to promote a marketing scheme benefitting themselves at the
expense of the minority. 90
If fiduciary duties are owed to minority shareholders by the
sellers of controlling shares when the sale is to outsiders, as in
Perlman, or to another enterprise controlled by the controlling
shareholders, as in Jones, the Donahue court has pursued the logical
extension of the Jones holding. As in Jones, the Donahue case con-
cerned an artificially created market for close corporation shares. In
Donahue, however, the corporation was the purchaser. In Jones,
fiduciary duties were imposed on majority shareholders based on
the assumption that the minority, lacking power to act, needs protec-
tion against overreaching by the majority. 91 Inside the corporation,
where the majority's control is essentially unbounded, this assump-
tion is even more likely to be true. By imposing fiduciary duties on
88 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
89 Id. at 115, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604. At the time ofJones, the so-called
majority rule was that majority shareholders had a perfect right to dispose of their stock
without regard to the wishes of the minority, because a director's or controlling shareholder's
trust relationship did not extend to individual shareholders in the sale and purchase of stock.
The "special facts" rule developed as an exception to the majority rule, and put the directors
and controlling shareholders in a limited fiduciary relationship with other stockholders in
transactions involving their stock, whenever these individuals possessed "special information"
regarding the value of corporate shares not available to the minority. The court in Jones
proposed to follow what was then called the minority rule, and held that transactions involving
transfers of stock among shareholders in the corporation were subject to the comprehensive
rule of good faith and inherent fairness to the minority where control of the corporation was a
material factor in the transaction.
90 1 Cal. 3d at 115, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604. The court added:
Although a controlling shareholder who sells or exchanges his shares is not under an
obligation to obtain for the minority the consideration that he receives in all cases,
when he does sell or exchange his shares the transaction is subject to close scrutiny.
1 Cal. 3d at 117, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
91 Id. at 111-12, 460 P.2d at 473-74, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
19761 1005
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
all close corporation shareholders (not only the majority sharehold-
ers), the Donahue court offers even more protection against the
discriminatory creation of markets. Any shareholder or group of
shareholders able to manipulate corporate policy and negotiate a
stock repurchase is now bound under Donahue by the standard of
utmost good faith and loyalty.
The court in Donahue was also concerned with the inability of a
minority shareholder to obtain dissolution.92 If this remedy was
readily available to dissident shareholders fearing either a freeze-out
or a freeze-in, it would have been an alternative to seeking redress
for breach of fiduciary duty, albeit somewhat more drastic. It would,
however, allow the complaining shareholder to remove his assets
from the enterprise. But as the court noted, dissolution was not
readily available to the likely victims of these marketing schemes:
[T]he stockholder in the close corporation or "incorporated
partnership" may achieve dissolution and recovery of his share of
the enterprise assets only by compliance with the rigorous terms of
the applicable chapter of the General Laws.... To secure dissolu-
tion of the ordinary close corporation.., the stockholder, in the
absence of corporate deadlock, must own at least fifty percent of
the shares ... or have the advantage of a favorable provision in the
articles of organization .... The minority stockholder, by defini-
tion lacking fifty percent of the corporate shares, can never "au-
thorize" the corporation to file a petition for dissolution... by his
own vote. He will seldom have at his disposal the requisite favora-
ble provision in the articles of organization. 93
By recognizing the difficulty of obtaining dissolution, and granting
other relief and protection- rather than liberalizing the availability of
dissolution to dissident close corporation shareholders, the Donahue
court preserved the concept that an operative corporation should
not be dissolved if otherwise avoidable. 94
92 See note 93 and accompanying text infra.
93 -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15. As noted by Donahue, a petition for dissolution
could be filed in Massachusetts when authorized by a majority of the voting stock, or by 40% or
more of the voting stock, if the directors and the shareholders were deadlocked in their voting
power. MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 156, § 99 (1970). Voluntary dissolution could be effected only by
a vote of two-thirds of the voting shares, unless otherwise provided by the articles of incorpo-
ration or the by-laws. Id. § 100.
14 Close corporation dissolution is a more readily available remedy for a dissident share-
holder in other jurisdictions. See generally Note, supra note 40. The notion that corporations
bear a strong resemblance to partnerships is an important factor in the more liberal views. See
In re Gordon & Weiss, 32 App. Div. 2d 279, 301 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1st Dep't 1969), where the
court stated:
It is being increasingly realized that the relationship between the stockholders in
close corporations vis-h-vis each other in practice closely approximates the relation-
ship between partners .... As a consequence, when a point is reached where the
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It seems, therefore, that the Donahue court was justified in
raising the standard of fiduciary duty for close corporation share-
holders. To protect those who have placed their trust, confidence,
and financial assets in the hands of close business associates, a strict
test of utmost good faith and loyalty is required. The test only has
meaning when applied to a set of facts, and this gives the court
flexibility to deal with a variety of situations and to determine when
and if a breach of this standard of duty has occurred. If predictabil-
ity suffers, it suffers at the expense of equity. More importantly, by
employing what is essentially a bifurcated decision process, the
Donahue court has preserved wide latitude for the equal-opportunity
shareholders who are actively conducting the business of the corporation cannot
agree, it becomes in the best interests of those shareholders to order a dissolution.
Id. at 281, 301 N.Y.S2d at 842. See also Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965), where Chief Judge Desmond, dissenting, said:
The modern and just rule ... is that a court of equity should wind up the affairs even
of a solvent going corporation when gross mismanagement or fraudulent or inequit-
able conduct causes real danger of imminent loss to stockholders which danger
cannot be prevented except by liquidation, and where the circumstances have created
a real exigency and liquidation will serve a beneficial purpose to all stockholders.
Id. at 805, 210 N.E.2d at 356, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
Other New York cases agree that the lack of faith and trust that produces deadlock may
be the basis for a finding that dissolution is beneficial to the shareholders, even for a profitable
corporation. In the case of deadlock among shareholders and directors, dissolution should not
be denied merely because the corporation has been, or could be, carried on at a profit, but in the
absence of deadlock, dissolution would seem to be a last-resort remedy. See N.Y. Bus. Cor. LAW §
Illl(b)(3) (McKinney 1963); see Surchin v. Approved Business Mach. Co., 55 Misc. 2d 888, 286
N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1967); In re Pivot Punch & Die Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 713, 182 N.Y.S.2d 459
(Sup. Ct. 1959).
Notwithstanding the broad New York view, courts are still hesitant to decree the winding
up of a going corporation. In the absence of statutes, equity courts refuse to wind up a solvent
corporation or appoint a receiver for the liquidation of its affairs unless there is sufficient
fraud, oppression, or deadlock so as to render the corporation inoperative. See Johnston v.
Livingston Nursing Home, Inc., 282 Ala. 309, 211 So. 2d 151 (1968); Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc., 264 Ore. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973). But see Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated
Box Co., 20 I1. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960), where the court said:
It is not necessary that fraud, illegality or even loss-be shoWn to exhibi-oppression of
plaintiffs and their interest in the corporation. Corporate dissolution is a drastic
remedy that must not be lightly invoked. . . . Nevertheless, when oppression is
positively shown, the oppressed are entitled to the protection of the law.
Id. at 220-21, 170 N.E.2d at 138.
Today, courts are reluctant to interfere with the internal workings of a corporation due to
entrenchment of the business-judgment rule and principles of majority rule. This also reduces
the frequency of dissolution decrees issued at the request of dissident shareholders. By
granting relief to the minority shareholders in Donahue on grounds broader than mere
oppression, the court created an alternative remedy to dissolution not often found in other
jurisdictions. Whether a court with jurisdiction to enter a dissolution decree would do so, in a
case similar to Donahue, with added oppressive actions by controlling shareholders, is not clear.
The Donahue court's concern with the inability of minority shareholders to obtain dissolution
in Massachusetts does, however, seem to imply that dissolution is not to be liberalized where
other equitable relief is available.
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requirement. 95 The court first defined the standard of fiduciary
duty applicable to close corporation shareholders. It then deter-
mined that, based on this duty, equal opportunity was required
under certain circumstances as a component of that duty. Since the
shareholders were not offered an equal opportunity to sell, the court
held that the duty was breached, and awarded relief. The next
section of this Note will attempt to demonstrate that this two-step
analysis will prevent the spread of the equal-opportunity require-
ment to inappropriate fact situations.
IV
THE EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE
After defining the standard of fiduciary duty applicable to close
corporation shareholders, the Donahue court applied the standard to
close corporation stock repurchases:
When the corporation reacquiring its own stock is a close corpora-
tion, the purchase is subject to the additional requirement... that
the stockholders, who, as directors or controlling stockholders,
caused the corporation to enter into the stock purchase agree-
ment, must have acted with the utmost good faith and loyalty to
the other stockholders.
... To meet this test, if the stockholder whose shares were
purchased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling
stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each stockholder
an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares to the
corporation at an identical price.96
The court in Donahue believed that equal opportunity was necessary
to make the same benefits available to both the minority and the
majority: the ability to artificially create a market for shares and to
reach liquid corporate assets for personal use. 7 To the extent that
close corporations were characterized by the court as lacking a ready
market,9 8 the holding, as limited to close corporations, furthers valid
policy goals-limited marketability of shares accompanied by an
inability to obtain dissolution provides ample opportunities for lock-
ing minority shareholders into the corporation if the majority is
allowed to create markets and siphon off corporate assets in pay-
ment for their shares to the exclusion of other shareholders.
The notion that all shareholders have an equal (proportionate)
'5 S~e text accompanying notes 121-27 infra.
96 -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 5"18.
97 Id. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19.
"s See notes 49-53, 86-90 and accompanying text supra.
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right to corporate assets in the absence of stated preferences under-
lies the requirement imposed by many cases that a reduction of
stated capital must operate pro rata on all shareholders. 99 In
Donahue, however, the purchased shares were held in the corporate
treasury and not retired; thus the cases concerning the reduction of
stated capital would at first seem inapplicable. Indeed, in Mas-
sachusetts, as elsewhere, the mere purchase of stock by a corpora-
tion does not necessarily result in a reduction of stated capital. 100
Therefore, prior to Donahue, a Massachusetts corporation was not
required to buy stock to be held and not retired in a ratable manner
from the shareholders.' 0 ' By referring to a preferential distribution
of assets as a rationale for the equal opportunity holding, the
Donahue court implied that the mere repurchase-reduction of stated
capital distinction may only be superficially valid. 0 1 In both ordi-
nary repurchases and reductions of stated capital, assets flow im-
mediately to the selling shareholders, and if one shareholder or
group of shareholders is excluded from participating, the distribu-
tion would seem to be inequitably preferential. In a reduction of
stated capital, there is, in effect, an overall contraction of assets, so it
seems logical that all shareholders should participate. Similarly, in a
repurchase of stock for the corporate treasury, the treasury shares
acquired are not regarded as an asset of the corporation and thus
there is also a contraction of assets. Although the excluded share-
holders theoretically retain an increased proportionate interest in
corporate assets after the repurchase, the corporation's liquid assets
are decreased. 0 3 The Donahuecourt, by extending equal opportu-
nity to treasury share repurchases, may be implying that stability of
'9 In General Investment Co. v. American Hide and Leather Co., 98 N.J. Eq. 326, 129 A.
244 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925), the court held that a corporation purchasing stock for retirement
in a plan for the reduction of stated capital must buy ratably from each shareholder who wishes to
sell. ld. at 331, 129 A. at 246; accord, Iback v. Elevator Supplies Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 90, 177 A. 458
(Chancery 1935). See also Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 74 HARV. L.
REv. 866 (1961), where the author notes that "[i]t seems doubtful as a matter of corporate law
today that the majority shareholders could compel a corporation to redeem their own shares, to
the exclusion of the minority shareholders, unless the latter were willing." Id. at 910.
100 Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937).
10; Id. at 431, 8 N.E.2d at 914.
102 See D. HERwrrz, BUSINESS PLANNING 459 (1966):
[Als a general proposition the fact that stock is being repurchased from some
stockholders does not entitle other stockholders to demand pro rata treatment....
Some early.., cases which intimated the existence of such a requirement ... inay be
explained by the fact that they involved repurchase of stock as a method of reducing
capital, as authorized by some corporate statutes, and of course a requirement for
pro rata distribution in connection with a reduction of capital stands on a very
different footing and establishes no precedent for an ordinary repurchase transac-
tion.
103 See id. at 422-26.
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the excluded shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporate
assets after a share repurchase is illusory if the majority is able to
manipulate policy affecting the status or ultimate disposition of the
repurchased treasury shares'0 4 or the course of future corporate
share transactions. 10
5
Although other courts have also suggested the equal-
opportunity concept as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duties
involved in the sale of shares, 10 6 one obvious problem with requiring
an equal opportunity to sell is that if the other shareholders want to
1 04 In Massachusetts, stockholders do not have preemptive rights to acquire stock of the
corporation unless such rights are provided by the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. See
notes 131-34 and accompanying text infra.
10 Unless an equal opportunity is given to all stockholders, the purchase of shares
from a member of the controlling group operates as a preferential distribution of
assets. In exchange for his shares, he receives a percentage of the contributed capital
and accumulated profits of the enterprise. The funds he so receives are available for
his personal use. The other stockholders benefit from no such access to corporate
property and cannot withdraw their shares of the corporate profits and capital in this
manner unless the controlling group acquiesces.
-Mass. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19 (emphasis in original).
106 See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969) where the court noted:
Had defendants afforded the minority an opportunity to exchange their stock on the
same basis or offered to purchase them at a price arrived at by independent apprais-
al, their burden of establishing good faith and inherent fairness would have been
much less.
Id. at 114, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604. The court reasoned that the dissenting
shareholders in Jones should have been given the same opportunity to tender their shares and
obtain the same consideration as given the majority in their marketing scheme.
The California courts have also suggested the equal-opportunity doctrine as a remedy
in sale-of-control cases involving a disproportionate price reflecting a premium for control. In
Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969), majority shareholders
accepted an outside offer for the purchase of their shares and excluded the minority from
participation in the sale. The court found a breach of fiduciary duty and held:
The rule we have adopted here simply is that the duty of the majority stockholder-
director, when contemplating the sale of the majority stock at a price not available to
other stockholders and which sale may prejudice the minority stockholders, is to act
affirmatively and openly with full disclosure so that every opportunity is given to obtain
substantially the same advantages that such fiduciary secured and for the full protection
of the minority. This duty was violated here.
Id. at 272, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
See also Hill, supra note 77, where the author points out that generally a seller may accept a
premium for a sale of controlling shares to reflect the value of control. Sometimes, however,
the seller will be held accountable to the minority for this profit, and therefore it looks better if
the seller can persuade the buyer to make the same offer to all shareholders. No control
premium is then reflected, and there is no disadvantage to the minority. Id. at 991.
Some authors have also suggested that one of a minority shareholder's numerous rights is
to have an equal opportunity with all other shareholders to participate ratably in any sale of
shares pursuant to a favorable offer for the purchase of controlling shares in the corporation.
See Hill, supra note 77, and Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505 (1965). The Andrews theory is concerned primarily with the
right of equal opportunity as a remedy for sales of control reflecting a premium. Other
authors have translated this right into a duty placed on the controlling shareholders to secure
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participate, the original deal cannot be completed unless the buyer
increases his investment or the seller either sells fewer shares or
accepts a smaller consideration. Neither party may desire such a
result.10 7 Of course, the problem is greater when the buyer is an
outsider, for where the corporation is the purchaser, the controlling
shareholders bound by the equal-opportunity doctrine theoretically
may exercise their control to cause the corporation to commit more
of its assets to the transaction. l08
Other advantages and disadvantages of the equal-opportunity
doctrine surface by comparison with other techniques available for
awarding relief for an unfair stock repurchase. Equal opportunity is
preferable to allowing dissenting shareholders to tender their shares
the equal opportunity for the minority. See generally Israels, Corporate Purchase of Its Ozen
Shares-Are There New Overtones?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 620 (1965); Jennings, Trading in Corporate
Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1956); Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
725 (1956). The court in Donahue has taken this approach with respect to intracorporate share
purchases by the corporation as indicated by its language requiring the controlling sharehold-
ers to "cause the corporation to offer" to the other shareholders an equal opportunity to sell.
-Mass. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
Andrews, supra, suggests that equal opportunity would not be required when there is no
established market for a corporation's stock, since equal opportunity would require "all stock
sales to be consummated pursuant to purchase offers communicated to all stockholders." Id.
at 548. The effect would be to require shareholders to maintain an orderly market for their
corporation's stock, and to prohibit transactions outside of that market. Andrews believes that
the benefits of equal opportunity do not justify this result unless the shares sold carry enough
control to have a significant effect on the sale price. In that case equal opportunity would be
required. On the other hand, the lack of a ready market was precisely the reason that the court
in Donahue required equal opportunity, and it seems that Andrews's objections to the doctrine
would have less validity when the corporation was the purchaser rather than an outsider.
107 Hill, supra note 77, at 987.
"' Note, however, that the ability to commit more funds to the transaction may be
hampered by the requirement that there be legally available funds. See generally, Annot., 61
A.L.R. 3d 1049 (1975). Such action would present a problem in those jurisdictions that allow
stock repurchases only out of earned surplus (see note 9supra), since this requirement places a
finite limit on the amount of corporate assets available for such a transaction.
Prior to Donahue, a solvent Massachusetts corporation could purchase its own shares in
good faith if there was no prejudice to creditors or stockholders. See Scriggins v. Thomas
Dalby Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N.E. 749 (1935). Donahue sets out the required protection for
shareholders, but perhaps more protection for creditors should be promulgated to accom-
pany Donahue. A stock repurchase followed by fully exercised equal-opportunity rights in
accordance with Donahue could conveniently deplete the assets available for creditors and
thereby prejudice them. Presumably the Scriggins test would cover such a scenario, but a more
objective standard to determine legally available funds for stock repurchases, such as surplus
or earned surplus, would provide more predictability. Without such a standard, a creditor
prejudiced by a corporate stock repurchase has a more difficult case to make out, although
cases such as Pepper v. Litton, (308 U.S. 295 (1939) (directors owe fiduciary duty to entire
corporate community of interest, including creditors)) provide some assistance. See generally
Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 758 (1956). Note again, the inherent tension between legally available
funds and the ability of a given transaction to pass muster under the equal opportunity
doctrine when a sufficient number of shareholders wish to exercise their rights under
Donahue.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:986
and receive fair value, 10 9 since complex valuation problems are
thereby avoided." 0°In addition, under the equal-opportunity doc-
trine the other shareholders receive the benefit of the original re-
purchase price which is a potential consideration for shareholders
negotiating a corporate repurchase. Requiring an equal-opportunity
offering in close corporation stock repurchases also eliminates the
difficult burden of proof problems facing minority shareholders
seeking to establish a breach of fiduciary duty, and prevents disputes
over what constitutes a proper sale price for the stock."' A problem
would exist, however, if equal opportunity were carried to its ex-
treme: posit a situation where a controlling shareholder negotiates
the purchase by the corporation of all of his shares. An equal-
opportunity offering to all other shareholders could lead to a de
facto dissolution upon full acceptance by all shareholders." 2 It has
been suggested, however, that this possibility is all the more reason
for not allowing the majority to liquidate its holdings by using
corporate assets, and depleting an already limited market for close
corporation shares, unless all shareholders are thereby given the
same right, and consent to the sale."13 It seems unlikely that this
scenario would occur and result in the corporation owning all of its
shares. A controlling shareholder or group of shareholders facing
109 This device, often referred to as a shareholder's appraisal right, is often employed to
provide protection for minority shareholders oppressed in the contexts of mergers, consolida-
tions, and other extraordinary corporate matters.See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93,
116-17, 460 P.2d 464, 477, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 605 (1969).
110 Since close corporation shares are rarely traded, and are not listed on organized
exchanges, their value at any given time is difficult to determine. This is especially trouble-
some for estate and gift tax matters. On close corporation valuation generally, see F. BERALL & D.
HARNACK, VALUATION OF CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS (1972).
"' See Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 396 Pa. 320, 152 A.2d 894
(1959).
112 The possibility of proportionate distributions following a pro rata share repurchase
highlights the tax disadvantages inherent in the equal-opportunity doctrine, which may impede
its effectiveness as a remedy for minority shareholders. A redemption of stock will be taxed as
a dividend to the shareholder unless it qualifies for sale or exchange treatment because it is not
essentially equivalent to a dividend, substantially alters his proportionate interest, or completely
terminates his interest. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 302(a)-(b), (d), 301(a), (c), 316. (Section 317
defines a redemption to include a purchase by a corporation of its shares to be held as treasury
stock.) The biggest potential tax problem with the equal-opportunity doctrine as set forth in
Donahue is that if all shareholders fully exercise their equal-opportunity rights pursuant to a less
than complete redemption of a controlling shareholder's stock, the distribution by the corporation
will by definition be proportional to all shareholders, and thus taxable to them as dividends. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b). This tax cost could deter shareholders from accepting the equal-
opportunity offering when made to them by the corporation, and could also develop into a
strong-arm bargaining weapon for majority and minority shareholders. See also Overman, Section
303 Stock Redemptions By Closely Held Corporations, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 218 (1974).
"' Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 396 Pa. 320, 328, 152 A.2d 894,
897-98 (1959) (opinion of Cohen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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this dilemma would probably be unable to dispose of all of their
shares to the corporation in this manner if all the remaining share-
holders had the intention of exercising their equal-opportunity
rights, since the corporation would then be the unwitting owner of
all of its own shares. In this situation, dissolution is the more likely
result. If all shareholders wish to sell their holdings, there is no
reason to continue the enterprise.
Given the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the equal-
opportunity doctrine, was its application justified on the facts of
Donahue? It is not entirely clear what motivated the plaintiff's discon-
tent and compelled her to attempt to sell her shares. 114 The court
seemed more concerned with the potential for abuse, rather than
the existence of actual oppression, and the holding was at least
partially motivated by a desire to protect other shareholders in
future cases. 1 5 The only requirement that must be met to invoke
equal opportunity is that controlling shareholders cause the corpo-
ration to purchase stock from a member of the controlling group." 6
The court found that the Rodd family constituted a controlling
group because they were a "close-knit [family] . . . with [a] strong
community of interest."'"1 7 The stock repurchase from Rodd was
therefore a breach of the newly defined fiduciary duty owed to the
plaintiff, because Rodd was a member of the controlling group, and
no equal opportunity to sell was offered to the other shareholders.
An alternative approach would have been to find a breach of
fiduciary duty in a more general sense, based on the facts of
Donahue, and require equal opportunity as a remedy for this particu-
lar case. The court instead defined a close corporation shareholder's
fiduciary duty to include the duty of offering equal opportunity, and
then found a breach in the failure to so offer. As the court indi-
cated, '8 this means that in future cases one of the essential elements
of a close corporation stock repurchase from controlling sharehold-
ers is an offering of an equal opportunity to sell to the other share-
holders. Nothing less will satisfy the fiduciary duty standard. This
broader technique ofjudicial legislation now applicable to all similar
14 The lower court indicated that operating losses began to occur in the years im-
mediately following the purchase of Rodd's shares, but it is not certain that this was the
plaintiff's primary reason for objecting to the share repurchase. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co., -App. Dec.-, 307 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. App. 1975).
.. The court was also concerned that full control of the corporation was being manipu-
lated and solidified in Rodd's sons. -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 520 n.28.
116 Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
117 Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 519.
118 Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
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fact patterns has the advantage of predictability, but if the holding is
not sufficiently limited by either its terms or its implications, unwar-
ranted extensions of the equal-opportunity doctrine may unduly
hamper other corporate transactions.
The court qualified the equal-opportunity requirement by sub-
jecting it to waiver by consent of all shareholders, either in the
corporate by-laws, the articles of incorporation, or in an appropriate
shareholder agreement.it 9 Whether this escape route will allow reg-
ular avoidance of equal opportunity is unclear, but those sharehold-
ers most susceptible to oppression by a close corporation stock re-
purchase are also those most likely to give uninformed advance
consent. It seems, however, that valid corporate transactions will be
able to use one or more of these qualifications to avoid rescission by
failure to comply with Donahue.a20
The decision in Donahue also limited the equal-opportunity
requirement to close corporations as defined in the opinion.2 1 This
limitation will effectively prevent the spread of the equal-opportu-
nity doctrine to larger public-issue corporations for several rea-
sons. 22 The Donahue court framed its holding in terms of a re-
quirement that directors or controlling shareholders, who cause the
corporation to enter into stock repurchase agreements, act with
utmost good faith and loyalty toward other shareholders. 2 3 To
meet this standard of duty, these individuals must cause the corpo-
ration to give other shareholders an equal opportunity to sell a
ratable number of shares. In most public-issue corporations, the
controlling shareholders will infrequently cause the corporation to
purchase shares, because this is a management function traditionally
"19 Id. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 518 n.24. See Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modern Corpora-
tion Laws, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 637 (1959-60), where the requirement of equal opportunity in
share repurchases is urged as a general proposition. Exempted from this requirement,
according to the author, are justifiable transactions such as buy-sell agreements on the death
or retirement of one of the shareholders, or other such arrangements designed to keep the
corporation "close." Presumably such arrangements could comply with Donahue if all share-
holders consent in advance, or ratify subsequent to the transaction. As illustrated by Donahue,
however, without such consent, an allegedly bona fide repurchase is subject to rescission at the
behest of other shareholders. Therefore, planning for compliance with Donahue is now of
paramount importance.
120 Note the bargaining leverage that Donahue gives by implication to minority shareholders.
Perhaps the only answer to the obvious implications for the indirect minority veto power over
repurchase transactions is that the minority shareholders are also subject to the test of utmost good
faith and loyalty in their dealings with the majority.
121 -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 511. See notes 46-55 and accompanying text supra.
122 The Donahue court expressly left open the question of the applicability of its holding to
other than close corporations. -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
123 Id. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
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vested in the board of directors.1 24 If the directors happen to be
controlling shareholders, the second half of the Donahue test pro-
vides a means of avoiding the equal-opportunity requirement-
shareholders in public-issue corporations are not held to as high a
standard of fiduciary duty as shareholders in close corporations.12 5
Note that the equal-opportunity doctrine was derived from, and is a
function of, fiduciary-duty standards. It is clear that the Donahue
court believed that equal opportunity was required on the.facts,
after completion of its two-step decisional methodology.12 6
Moreover, the advantage of the methodology employed by the court
is that it is flexible, and it is feasible to find on other facts that equal
opportunity is not required to meet the fiduciary-duty standards
applicable to public-issue corporation, however that standard is ver-
balized. Finally, the holding requiring equal opportunity is limited
to purchases from, and action by, members of the controlling group
of stockholders, defined with reference to a community of interest.
A community of interest was easy for the court to identify in
Donahue, since most of the defendants were members of the same
family. As a corporation increases both in size and extent of public
ownership, the danger of oppressive action by this type of a control-
ling group decreases.12 7
In addition to the logic and verbalization of the Donahue equal-
opportunity holding, the fundamental rationale for the doctrine is
another reason why the requirement will probably not spread to
public-issue corporations. Donahue revolves around the peculiarities
of close corporations, the intimacy of the relationship between
shareholders, the trust and confidence required for successful exis-
tence, and the legal problems facing shareholders outside the corpo-
ration. The standards of fiduciary duty are, and should be, different
for the two types of corporations. The Donahue court leaves open the
question of the applicability of its holding to corporations other than
close corporations, 128 but the implication is that the differences
124 Close corporations are characterized by identity of ownership and management,
whereas larger publicly-held corporations are not. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
12 See notes 69-70 and accompanying tektsupra. The validity of this distinction as a basis
for the court's holding is debatable, but it does exist, and it allows a convenient method for
judicial manipulation of the Donahue doctrine. The court in Donahue expressly contrasted the
standards of fiduciary duties owed in publicly held and close corporations. -Mass. at -, 328
N.E.2d at 515-16.
,26 See text accompanying note 95 supra.
127 If a "controlling group" were to arise in a large public-issue corporation and institute
oppressive action, traditional fiduciary-duty standards would afford relief. See notes 69-77
and accompanying text supra.
12s -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
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between the two types of corporations will prevent the extension of
the holding to public-issue corporations. i2 9 Shareholders in public-
issue corporations do not face as restricted a market as do share-
holders in close corporations. Dissatisfied shareholders can readily
liquidate their holdings in public markets, and although the price
may not always be satisfactory, the market does exist. The admini-
strative burden on a large public-issue corporation required to ex-
tend an offering to every shareholder whenever a stock repurchase
is contemplated is a prohibitive factor, especially as the corporation's
financial structure increases in complexity. This practice could also
have an undesirable effect on the securities market, where investors
base their decisions on supply and demand price factors on listed
exchanges. Finally, although a repurchase of shares by a public-issue
corporation depletes liquid corporate assets in the same way as in a
close corporation, there is not the corresponding decrease in an
already limited market as in close corporations, since public-issue
stockholders can still utilize outside markets. The key to preventing
the spread of equal opportunity to public-issue corporations is the
definitional control retained by the Donahue court, and the court has
preserved enough flexibility to draw the line and require equal
opportunity only for those close corporations that are indeed close
and are hampered by a lack of marketability for their shares. 130
V
OTHER IMPLICATIONS
What are the ramifications of Donahue for other corporate
transactions? Will the sale of shares by close corporations require
equal opportunity, even in the absence of preemptive rights in the
by-laws? The same logic would seem to apply: if buying from the
majority oppresses the minority by contraction of the market, so
does selling. By definition there is no market for the minority to buy
shares in order to maintain proportionate control, and in Mas-
sachusetts stockholders do not have preemptive rights to acquire
stock of the corporation unless provided by the articles of incorpora-
tion or the by-laws. 131 Moreover, Donahue explicitly negated the
suggestion that preemptive rights will be required where not pro-
vided by law.1 32 The court suggested instead that traditional
"I9 To the extent that publicly-held corporations habitually make pro rata offers, the issue is
somewhat academic. Cf. N.Y.S.E. Company Manual § A10.
, See text accompanying note 46-55 supra.
,3, MASS. ANN. LUws. ch. 156, § 20 (1970).
132 -Mass. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 519 n.25.
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fiduciary duties protect minority shareholders from dilution of con-
trol at the hands of the majority by self-serving stock issuances. 133
Nevertheless, it is possible that the higher standard of fiduciary duty
made applicable by Donahue to close corporations could'be con-
strued to require preemptive rights even where not mandated
under traditional circumstances. 34
The real significance of Donahue lies in its support of the trend
of recognizing the dose corporation as a legal entity apart from
public-issue corporations. By acknowledging the peculiarities and
special characteristics inherent in close corporations, and providing
relief for shareholders based on these distinctions, the court has
helped to alleviate the identity crisis that plagues those close corpo-
rations forced to comply with a corporate law ill-suited to their
internal operation. Furthermore, as courts become more willing to
subject dose corporation transactions to a higher degree of scrutiny
and require a higher standard of fiduciary duty, shareholders will
133 Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 519 n.25.
134 See Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 335 N.E.2d 334, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1975),
which affirmed a denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in an action charging
three directors of a corporation with a breach of fiduciary duty involving a sale of treasury
stock. The plaintiff alleged that the directors violated their fiduciary duty by selling treasury
shares to themselves and to two other corporate employees without offering her the opportu-
nity to purchase a proportionate number of shares. Plaintiff tendered an offer to buy enough
treasury shares from the corporation to maintain her proportionate control, but this offer was
refused. The plaintiff alleged conspiracy and fraud on the part of the defendants to deprive
her family of their proportionate holdings, and moved for summary judgment. In affirming a
denial of this motion, the court noted that although shareholders in New York do not have
preemptive rights to purchase treasury stock unless the articles of incorporation so provide,
directors owe a "fiduciary responsibility... to treat all shareholders fairly and evenly." Id. at
491, 335 N.E.2d at 337, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 126. The court said that departure from a uniform
treatment of stockholders (or, not offering an equal opportunity to buy) would be justified
only by a bona fide business purpose, which the directors had the burden of proving. Id. at
492, 335 N.E.2d at 338, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 127. Even if such a bona fide purpose exists, the
purpose must be such that it could not have been accomplished any other way than by a failure
to make an equal-opportunity offering:
[Plaintiffs recovery] would follow .... if it were found that the actions of the directors
were not, in objective and accomplishment, in good faith furtherance of an indepen-
dent, significant corporate purpose sufficient to override the obviously legitimate
interest of plaintiff in retaining or regaining an equal 50% interest in the corporation
and which purpose could not have been substantially accomplished by other means
which would not have disturbed the equality of the two-family ownership.
Id. at 493, 335 N.E.2d at 338-39, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 128.
This case may imply that a strong showing of compliance with fiduciary duties is required
before equal opportunity may be avoided in the sale of treasury stock, even in the absence of
preemptive rights. See also Kessler, supra note 119, where Professor Kessler argues for equal
opportunity in the resale of treasury shares. His reasons are similar to those advanced in the
context of share repurchases: to protect shareholders from dissolution of the asset value of their
shares. Kessler would make a "legitimate transaction" exception here for issuance of treasury
shares "pursuant to employee incentive plans.
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receive more protection not only in stock repurchases, but also in
other oppressive situations such as dividend withholdings, excessive
salary payments, freeze-outs, and other breaches of fiduciary duty.
CONCLUSION
In Donahue, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rec-
ognized by doctrinal innovation that close corporations have a dis-
tinct identity and distinct problems. By showing a willingness to
accord close corporations the special treatment that they require, the
court developed a standard of fiduciary duty for close corporation
shareholders that will protect shareholders' rights in most situations.
The court placed an added burden on close corporations by requir-
ing equal opportunity to participate in close corporation stock re-
purchases, but it is a justifiable burden. By developing the equal-
opportunity concept as an element of the fiduciary duty required in
this particular context, the court preserved enough flexibility to
prevent the unwarranted spread or misuse of the doctrine, and the
strict standard of fiduciary duty will help alleviate other injustices
perpetrated on close corporation shareholders by their compatriots.
Alan H. Farnsworth
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